Leibniz says that this seems to him to be If it is contained explicitly the proposition is analytic if only implicitly, it is synthetic. In every true affirmative proposition, whether it be necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the notion of the predicate is contained either explicitly or implicitly in that of the object. I think we may take the following as the Principle itself: I think it is difficult to be certain as to which is the Principle itself and which of them he would have regarded as immediate inferences from it or obvious applications of it. Leibniz formulates the Principle in several slightly different My account of the Predicate-in-Notion Principle will be derived from those two closely interrelated sources. Both the Discourse and the Correspondence with Arnauld remained unpublished until the middle of the XIXth century. It was further elucidated and defended in the Correspondence with Arnauld, which was occasioned by Leibniz submitting a synopsis of the Discourse for Arnauld's inspection and criticism. What I call the Predicate-in-Notion Principle was, as far as I know, first explicitly formulatedĪnd recognized by Leibniz as a basic principle in his philosophy in the Discourse on Metaphysics, which he wrote towards the end of 1685. Is the Principle compatible with contingency?.Does the Principle really have any ontological consequences?. Is the complete notion of the individual a genuine entity?.Leibniz's Predicate-in-Notion Principle and Some of its Alleged Consequences
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